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Developmental Comparative Philosophy: Identifying Common Trends Between American
Libertarian and Chinese Thoughts
Abstract
East/west comparative philosophy often focuses on the differences between philosophies
as finished states which, though effective at showing differences in thought, emphasizes the
otherness of foreign traditions. In order to establish meaningful similarities between the
development on eastern and western traditions, I compared the development of American
liberalism (1651-1776 CE) and Chinese Confucianism and Daoism (772-221 BCE), focusing on
the similarities between social contract to enlightenment philosophers and the early to late
Hundred Schools of Thought Confucian and Daoist philosophers. Three principals were derived
from this process: a shift from external to internal justifications for the state causes increased
secularism within philosophies, ideal states are based on virtuous leaders when the state is
integrated into the citizen’s lives and virtuous structure when the state separate, and
philosophical skepticism towards human nature creates more restrictive governments. This
method of developmental comparison could yield more accurate and universal principles if
applied to more traditions.
Introduction
Many academic disciplines have taken an interest in comparative studies, especially in
regards to the individualistic/collectivistic differences accentuated by western and eastern
cultures respectively. Journals like Philosophy East and West (originated in 1951) show that
philosophers have likewise engaged in comparative work for many years, with concerns about
representing foreign traditions accurately existing from the discipline’s beginnings (Creel 1953).
To avoid making overgeneralized claims, comparative philosophers separate regional biases
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from foreign traditions by avoiding historical, cultural and ideological parallels between regions
when comparing philosophies. Much work in east/west comparative philosophy focuses on
comparisons based on specified topics, such as ethics or consciousness, instead of a more
comprehensive analysis as a result. Though precautions like these are critical for understanding
foreign philosophies and facilitating compromise between traditions (Stepanyants 2014), it
unfortunately creates a sense of otherness that prevents genuine commonalities from being
recognized.
It would be foolish to argue that there are not elements of exclusiveness between eastern
and western traditions, but the value of universal trends between philosophies is enormous
should they exist, and the east/west dichotomy inhibits the research needed to find them. A
different perspective must be used; instead of comparing philosophies as they are, we could
instead examine the process of how philosophies develop and find similarities there. To illustrate
how these developmental comparisons can be made; this paper will compare the philosophies
crucial to the development of American and Chinese thought (British social contract theorists to
colonial American libertarianism and the original Confucian and Daoist sages1). These
philosophies were chosen based on two qualities: the difference between American and Chinese
philosophies are extensive enough to show that the development-oriented comparative approach
has value in seemingly opposite ideologies, and they represent an individualistic/collectivistic
dichotomy within their culture (libertarianism and Daoism are individualistic, whereas
Confucianism and Hobbes’s absolutism are collectivistic in comparison).
Methodology

1

The term sage refers to a master of philosophy whose thoughts and actions are aligned completely to their
tradition; the term is used in both Confucian and Daoist texts (Hinton 2013). The qualities defining a sage vary
based on the tradition, but they usually imply a dedication to their ideals more substantial than the term philosopher.
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Among others, three common problems that plague comparative philosophers in their
analysis of foreign philosophies are descriptive chauvinism (thinking other philosophies use the
same base assumptions as your own), incommensurability (untranslatable concepts) and
perennialism (thinking foreign philosophies, especially older ones, never change) (Littlejohn
2016). Due to how integrated morality, science (Creel 1953), religion and metaphysics (Gu and
Guo 2015) is with Chinese political philosophy, these problems are particularly troubling in
making Chinese and western comparisons. The approach I propose addresses these concerns by
establishing a common ground in developmental trends across philosophical traditions. For
example; comparing specific virtues between two traditions can lead to misinterpretations, but by
focusing on how virtues change similarly in each individual tradition in response to similar
situations (i.e a change in resource availability correlates with more frugal values), a philosopher
can make a well define and universal comparison. Economic, cultural, historical and/or general
changes in thought can serve as catalysts for change, but those events must have sufficient
analogues in both cultures for the comparisons to be genuine. To demonstrate this method, I will
start with an overview of both eastern and western philosophies before identifying their
developmental commonalities.
Philosophy Summary: Chinese
Both Confucianism and Daoism originated during the Eastern Zhou dynasty (772-221
BCE); further divided by the Spring and Autumn (772-475 BCE) and Warring States (475-221
BCE) periods (Tanner 2010). Though the Western Zhou dynasty is well regarded as the
progenitor of the Chinese identity, the Eastern Zhou was considered as a period of decline even
by its own citizens due to a decline in the emperor’s authority, a deterioration of alliances
between feudal states and the rise of the warrior class in the Zhou bureaucracy (Tanner 2010).
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This is evident even in the name “Eastern Zhou”; the Western Zhou (1046-771 BCE) utilized the
same feudal system and is differentiated only by the fact that the western territories were lost.
This degradation caused a rise in scholarship that emerged throughout the Eastern Zhou with the
goal of understanding the causes of the state’s problems and creating the policies and
philosophies needed to fix them (Hinton 2013). This movement is known as the Hundred
Schools of Thought; it encompasses many classical Chinese philosophies spanning from the
Spring and Autumn period to the end of the Warring States period (when the Zhou Dynasty fell,
and multiple feudal states vied for power) when the Qin dynasty rose in 221 BCE (Tanner 2010).
Confucianism and Daoism are the most influential philosophies to come from this period.
Confucianism is named after its creator Confucius (551-479 BCE), who posited that ren
(compassion for others) is the foundational principle that creates both a stable society and
meaningful life (Chan 1963). Thus, the state’s and ruler’s purpose are to instill ren in the
citizenry by teaching filial piety and ritual (Wong 2011). Filial piety refers to the mutual
obligations people have in respecting and maintaining relationships (ruler-subject, father-son,
etc.); for hierarchical relationships, those in authoritative positions have the responsibility to act
as role models and those in subordinate positions have the responsibility to learn from and follow
their example (though it is expected for subordinates to correct their superiors if necessary).
Rituals refer to the proper actions and mannerisms one is expected to undertake in a task or
situation. By learning and adhering to rituals, the individual learns the correct actions needed to
achieve ren in their current positions as well as the values of ren that can be applied to address
ambiguous situations.
Confucianism was continued by Mencius and Xunzi, who both expanded on the tradition
by introducing human nature into Confucian thought. Mencius (371-289 BCE) claimed that
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human nature is inherently good because we are naturally averse to inhumane acts (evident by
the universal distress caused by a child falling in a well), though we obviously maintain more
reverence to relationships closer to us like with family members (Wong 2011). This means the
state creates policies that cultivates the ren inherent in its citizens, and the desperate conditions
of a poor state is what drives people to immorality, not the citizens themselves. Xunzi (298-238
BCE) was not as optimistic, as he thought ren was absent from human nature. Since people lack
discipline and are quick to do acts that satisfy their feelings over what is right, it is up to filial
relationships (starting with the state) to instill ren into the populous (Chan 1963). Also notable in
Xunzi’s philosophy is the incorporation of some Daoist elements, specifically that heaven is
observable and can be reacted to, but is ultimately unknowable, and as such, we should focus on
human affairs in isolation of heaven (Chan 1963). He also deviated from Confucius by saying
talent and property were more important to respect than laws and people, ideas that resonates
more in legalist thought2 than in Confucianism (Elstein). Mencius also differed from Confucius
in saying that the emperor and state needed to be constant authority figures (Mencius 2013),
whereas Confucius relegated them to figureheads in an ideal state (Confucius 2013). To this end,
both Mencius and Xunzi believed the ruler/state were always necessary in the citizen’s lives, but
Confucius believed that a citizenry that knew ren could be relied on to govern themselves and
teach ren to their children.
Daoism, originated by the semi-mythical Laozi (600-400 BCE?)3 in his Dao De Ching, is
centered around the metaphysical concept Dao. The term Dao is directly translated as meaning

2

Legalism was another philosophy originated in the Hundred Schools of Thought that prioritized strict state control
and using laws as ways to punish and reward people into being ideal citizens (Goldin 2018). Hsun Tzu’s disciples
became the originators of this movement, though Hsun Tzu himself is classified as a Confucian.
3
It is debatable when or if Laozi lived; it is even theorized that he was the personification of preexisting beliefs
compiled into the Dao De Ching by an unknown author(s) (Morgan 2001). Regardless, Laozi is commonly referred
to as the founder of Daoism.
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“way”; it refers to a universal and everlasting process of change that everything in the world
abides despite having individual characteristics (Hinton 2013)4. This can be conceptualized as a
life cycle; living beings are born, age, die and decompose, but although this process affects each
type of being differently (i.e a human vs a tree), they are all following the same cycle, or the
same Dao. The term Dao can refer to a specific cycle (the life cycle, the seasons, etc.) and the
cosmological rule of constant change. Complementing this is the principle of wuwei (meaning
action/nonaction), which promotes purposeful actions when needed and inaction otherwise
(Chan 1963). Daoist believe people (and states) struggle often because they act unnecessarily and
thus go against the Dao, so they embrace inaction as viable strategy. These principles applied to
the state emphasize a restrained government that acts only when the citizen's needs are at risk
(like in cases of invasion or famine) and abstains from its citizens’ lives in all other matters
(Feldt 2010). Where Confucians believed that the state was responsible for instilling or
cultivating ren into its citizens to create a stability, Daoist believe that instability is directly
caused by excessive state action (Chan 1963). This is because strict rules are incapable of
changing according to the Dao and obsessive acting only induces unnecessary conflict.
The main difference between Laozi and Zhuangzi (399-295 BCE) is that Zhuangzi
focused more on how to apply the Dao to personal life (Hinton 2013). Daoist doctrine remained
the same between the two; Zhuangzi mainly reiterated a lot of the points made in the Dao De
Ching in a different literary style. Some points Zhuangzi made that Laozi did not include
state/society creating values and desires that obstruct and manipulate what is necessary for a
good life (Zhuangzi 2013) and Confucian values being a second-best option compared to Daoism
(if you must have an interventionalist state) (Zhuangzi 2013). Zhuangzi was also unique in that

4

Confucius also used the term Dao in the Analects, but his interpretation referred to the pursuit of ren and is
unrelated to the Daoist interpretation
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he considered the self (or rather the individual’s attachment to it) as the cause of personal
problems because valuing it too much was incongruent with the Dao (because death was a
changing state of life) (Zhuangzi 2013). This, in conjunction with the continued acknowledgment
of Confucianism as a semi-viable state, gave Daoism credence as a personal philosophy that
could be integrated into other ideologies and likely encouraged the gradual shift from
philosophical to religious Daoism seen past the warring states period (Morgan 2001). It is also
worth noting that Zhuangzi heavily commented on Confucianism (even using Confucius as a
character in his book) (Zhuangzi, 2013), but his Confucian counterparts rarely commented on
Daoism, instead focusing on other philosophies like Yangism and Mohism (Mencius, 2013)5.
Xunzi was the most critical Confucian against Daoism, criticizing Laozi by saying that his
philosophy did not describe how people actually live (nor how they wanted to live) (Chan 1963);
Mencius never referenced Daoism at all.
Philosophy Summary: Western
American libertarianism refers to the focus in limited government and free market
economics predominantly seen in the 19th and 20th centuries (though it remains relevant in
modern American culture too) (McClelland 1996). This philosophy was cultivated in colonial
America as a result of the dissatisfaction and alienation colonists felt towards Britain during the
1700’s (Axelrod 2007), in addition to the spread of natural rights-based thinking dominant
throughout the enlightenment (McClelland 1996). Natural rights (derived from natural law) refer
to principles deduced through reason outlining the rights of individuals in a state of nature (i.e no
governments); many critiques towards the British government, including those found in the

5

The Dao De Ching has many ideas that could be used as critiques of Confucianism, but it is unknown whether
Laozi was referring to Confucius, as he and his specific principles was never directly mentioned in that book.
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Declaration of Independence, focus on their violation of the colonist’s natural rights (Axelrod
2007). Natural rights are a product of the Protestant Reformation and the increased skepticism
towards Catholic traditions (especially in protestant countries like Britain), specifically the
questioning of divine right arguments (Russell 1945). The period between the Reformation and
American Revolution (17th and 18th centuries) marks a transition from the social stratification
innate to divine right monarchism to the focus on equality in libertarianism, a change caused by
the introduction and development of natural rights arguments (Russell 1945). As such, I will start
with British social contract theorists (Hobbes and Locke) who first posed these arguments before
covering the influence of the enlightenment and ending with the American libertarian perspective
portrayed by Thomas Paine in his book Common Sense.
In social contract theory, the form and function of the state is predicated on how people
act in a state of nature (McClelland 1996). It was thought that any reasonable person in the state
of nature would deduce natural laws and from it natural rights, which are inherent principles of
life that everyone shares (the most universal and important being self-preservation and equality).
Since natural laws are difficult to enforce in the state of nature, people create and consent to
governments, sacrificing some of their natural liberties in exchange for security. Hobbes, Locke,
Paine and most enlightenment era thinkers all shared these premises; their differences mainly
concerned human nature and what government type was best suited to protecting natural rights.
Hobbes (1588-1679 CE) and Locke (1632-1704 CE) wrote their seminal works Leviathan
(1651 CE) and The Two Treatises of Government (1689 CE) in response to similar ideas and
events. Both books challenge the divine right argument (Locke, in fact, dedicated the entirety of
his first treatises to criticizing Robert Filmer’s variation on the theory (Filmer, 1680))6 and both

6

It is likely that Hobbes was responding to Filmer too in Leviathan since they lived during the same time and
Filmer’s Patriarcha was popular with the British monarchy (Filmer 1680).
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writers were influenced by the English civil war (1642-1651 CE) fought between parliament and
the monarchy (Pattison). Their differing statuses during the war, however, best epitomizes their
difference in philosophy. Hobbes was an associate of the British monarchy and wrote Leviathan
during the war, whereas Locke wrote The Two Treatises of Government 30 years separated from
the event without ties to the monarchy and with hindsight of the temporary Parliament state
established during the war (McClelland 1996). Thus, Locke had more of a reference of a nonmonarchical state and less investment in Britain’s institutions compared to Hobbes.
The greatest philosophical difference between Hobbes and Locke is that Hobbes thought
the state of nature inevitably led to war, but Locke thought cooperation could exist without a
state. This difference permeates throughout both Leviathan and the second of The Two Treatises
of Government. Hobbes’s view is based on a selfish and opportunistic conception of human
nature; people are inherently self-interested and narcissistic (since you only know your own
thoughts, you presume yourself to be superior to others), so we are primed to conflict with others
to expand our power (resources, influence and prestige). Though we desire power, our
understanding of natural law (self-preservation and everyone being born equal) makes us
skeptical about the abilities of others to do us harm and thus we willing to engage in peaceful,
risk-aversive compromises with them. The state is the result of this compromise; it is an entity to
which individuals surrender their power in exchange for common laws, defense and
punishments, which removes ambiguity and thus facilitates risk-free exchanges between citizens.
Locke, in contrast, believed that since any reasonable person would be aware of the natural laws,
you can expect most people in a state of nature to respect each other’s rights because they would
in turn respect yours (the idea being that people in the state of nature would mutually agree to
punish breakers of the natural law). Thus, the state is not required for societies to form because it
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would be in everyone’s interest to cooperate rather than engage in war. Instead, the state forms as
a convenience to enforce natural laws and organize labor more efficiently, which provides a
better life to its citizens when compared to the state of nature. Other aspects of Locke’s theory
follow from this point; property can exist within the state of nature because people can be
expected to respect an individual’s right to own their labor and democracies (preferably direct,
but representative are logistically better) are the preferred system of government because they
retain more natural liberties compared to other governments. Hobbes, in contrast, believed that
most rights (like property) unrelated to self-preservation are dependent on the state because
mutual trust does not exist in the state of nature. Also, despite the future association between
natural rights and democracy, Hobbes preferred monarchies as the ideal state because they
consolidated power within a single, consistent authority figure that can create more stable laws
compared to democracies. In sum, Hobbes believed that the state was a remedy for the abysmal
state of nature conditions, whereas Locke thought that the state was a refinement of the state of
nature’s best aspects.
Locke’s favorable perspective of the state of nature continued through enlightenment era
political thought (McClelland 1997). Though Locke clearly preferred democracies over
monarchies, he emphasized in his second treatise that whatever government the original founders
of a state (and people who subsequently join) agreed to is the government they should pursue. In
fact, though the second half of his second treatise is dedicated to explaining difficulties common
in monarchies, it is framed more as a critique of the British crown’s failure to protect natural
rights than claiming monarchies are unable to protect natural rights at all7. The enlightenment’s
heavy focus on human reason is why monarchies shifted from being unideal to detestable

7

Locke believed that monarchies formed because early states replicated the hierarchy found in the family structure;
they did not have to form through usurpation or conquest.
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between Locke and Paine. Since the state of nature and natural laws were deduced by reason
alone, enlightenment thinkers glorified them, any state that emphasized them was considered just
and states formed from other precedents (like monarchies) were deemed unjust (McClelland
1997). This culminated in Paine’s Common Sense (1776 CE), where he states that governments
are a necessary evil whose only purpose is to ensure a society’s defense and enforce laws, and
that they are only justified as a representational democracy. This is evident in Paine’s critiques of
the British crown; he focuses on their failure to protect English colonialist against the French and
Indian tribes during the Seven Years War, their policies restricting and taxing colonists in ways
other British citizens were not and their lack of representation in Parliament. Paine also
characterizes of the monarchical system as an intentionally confusing tyrant state that lacked any
right to rule outside of conquest. These critiques are emblematic of those found in Locke and the
enlightenment; the British broke the social contract by failing to protect (or even by infringing
upon) the colonial citizen’s natural rights. Paine is notable among other enlightenment era
thinkers for basing his polarization of natural-right based democracies and monarchies on
practical examples of the deficiencies in monarchies rather than supposed injustices as theorized
by other enlightenment thinkers, and it is likely why American libertarianism prioritizes
government noninterventionism and natural rights so heavily.
Justification for the State
An interesting trend across eastern and western thoughts is the gradual secularization of
the state. Divine right arguments were used to justify monarchs in both European and Chinese
culture prior to the Zhou dynasty (Tanner 2010) and as late as the 19th century in Europe
(Russell 1945). I explained how the social contract and subsequent enlightenment thinkers were
the result of the reformation, but the transition seen in China warrants further explanation.
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Traditional Chinese thought posits a three-way relationship between heaven, earth and humans,
where heaven was given the most influence and was thought to create principles that regulates
the other two. (Chan 1963). Governments were subject to tianming (the mandate of heaven)
which determined what policies and actions created successful states or led to ruin through war,
uprisings and/or economic or natural disasters (Chan 1963). The Shang dynasty (whom the Zhou
dynasty proceeded) believed heaven had tangible influence in human affairs and the emperor
was thought to be directly related to heaven and influential spirts (Morgan 2001), essentially
making him a god king (Hung 2019). When the Zhou dynasty overthrew the Shang, heaven was
recontextualized as ideals and processes rather than a tangible authority, and its influence on the
human world became more subtle (Chan 1963). This manifested as ren for Confucians and the
Dao for Daoist, ideals that are archivable for any state or individual who labors to learn them.
Though ren and the Dao are created by heaven, the consequences of following them occurs
solely within the human realm without overt divine interventionism. It was argued in The
Analects, for example, that the citizenry ren makes them more effective citizens which
strengthens the state; heaven does not directly bless the state to be successful. Likewise, the
social contract theorist’s separation of God from governments formed out of the state of nature
meant that the state was formed by people alone, and thus its successes and failures were human
caused as well. For both cultures, removing supernatural justifications for the states meant
philosophies justified the state’s authority by their adherence to principles (tianming and natural
rights respectively).
An explanation of differences between the western and Chinese conceptions of heaven is
warranted to strengthen this comparison, the most notable of which being agency. Heaven in the
west is synonymous with God; the will of heaven is whatever God decrees and any form of
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divine intervention in human affairs is attributed directly to Him. In Chinese culture, however,
who or what creates tianming is not emphasized (Hung 2019), and the will of heaven had to be
deduced through shamans, divination and observing the environment (Morgan 2001), meaning
heaven was ambivalent towards humans. This was certainly true for the Zhou culture, whose
myths avoided the topic of world creationism and focused instead on the creation of society and
the state (Tanner 2010); in fact, both Confucian and Daoist texts reference famous kings to
strengthen their arguments. Even within the Shang culture, god-kings were thought to have had a
connection with heaven, but they did not control heaven (Morgan 2001). Regardless of these
cultural differences, the comparison I suggest is predicated on the divine right to rule being the
same between these cultures, which was true for both divine right European and Shang states
despite Shang rulers being attributed with more divinity.
Ideal Governance
The most substantial difference between Chinese and western thought is the integration
of the state and the individual found in Confucianism. Confucians argue that the state and the
individual are reciprocal entities that facilitate or hamper each other’s growth. The state’s
purpose is to teach ren to its citizenry, and citizens knowledgeable in ren in turn creates a perfect
society (Wong 2011). A parallel can be made here in Hobbes’s theory, which is predicated on the
idea that the state is necessary for individual’s success and vice versa (since more citizens in a
state makes the state stronger by increasing its collective power) (Hobbes 1994). Both The
Analects and Leviathan attribute consent as a factor in determining the ruler’s authority; losing
tianming and failing to surpass the state of nature are both justifiable reasons to abandon an
authority, so the right to rule is not absolute. However, the goal of the Confucian state is the
moral development of its citizens, an obligation not found in the Hobbesian state. Hobbes
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deemed any action not restricted by the ruler nor an infringement of natural law as allowable, the
state is not inherently responsible to instill morality in the individual. Though a ruler can enforce
laws based on morality, Hobbes did not believe in a set moral code of which all states must
adhere to be successful. Thus, Confucius’s successors were favorable towards the state’s
authoritative power in its citizens’ lives (Chan 1963), whereas the philosophers who followed
Hobbes became more concerned with limiting the state’s power over the individual (McClelland
1996). This is intuitive; the more intertwined the state and citizens are, the more authority the
state needs in the citizen’s affairs to be effective.
Daoism also emphasizes the relationship between the state and the individual, though
unlike Confucianism, this relationship is corruptive. Daoist see state values as unnatural and
obstructive to the citizen’s understanding of the Dao (Zhuangzi 2013). The Daoist state is more
akin to the western perspective in this regard, where it is treated like a tool that facilitates the
citizenry rather than teach them. It should be emphasized however that none of the western
thinkers thought the dangers posed by the state were as spiritually insidious as the Daoist portray.
Paine’s “necessary evil” description of government is a likewise negative view of the state, but
he was more concerned with the abuses of power the state could physically impose on people
rather than its ability to create unnatural desires within the individual (Paine 2020). Although
western thinkers differed in how extensive the state’s responsibilities were, they always thought
that the state needed to have a consistent presence, which is not shared in how Daoist states
could theoretically be completely non-active when appropriate (Feldt 2010).
The growth and sustainability of the ideal state differs between the Confucian, Daoist and
Western philosophies. It is argued multiple times in both Confucius’s Analects and Mencius's
titular book that a just ruler draws support from citizens in unjust countries because they want to
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be ruled by an emperor with ren, thus bolstering the just state while diminishing the unjust states.
Western thinkers, in contrast, do not focus on how states expand their power, but rather on
maintaining what they have according to natural law. All the western philosophers agreed that
self-defense was quintessential, which is why they all agreed on common laws and defense
forces being justified despite the differences between Hobbes, Locke and Paine. Both Laozi and
Zhuangzi believed that restricting desires in things like wealth and power protected the citizens
because invaders would have no reason to attack, and citizens would have no reason to steal.
In sum, when the state is integrated into its citizen’s lives, the optimal state is justified by
being run virtuously, whereas an integrated state is virtuous by design. Confucian rulers must act
according to ren because the success of the state comes from the rulers being examples for the
citizens. Western thinkers, in contrast, described the optimal state as providing a minimal service
(common laws and defense); the quality of the rulers does not matter so long as these services
are maintained and natural rights are not infringed upon in the process. Thinkers past Hobbes
(especially Paine) were broader on what counted as infringing on nature rights, but they all
agreed on this premise. This is also evident in the preference for democracies from later western
thinkers; since the ideal state does not require an exceptional leader, then people might as well
represent themselves. Daoism agrees more with the western perspective because the state’s
actions are to be restricted in order to allow individual’s actions to be performed uninhibitedly.
Human Nature
Similar with how the concept of heaven differed across cultures, the different views of
nature must be understood to make any meaningful comparisons with human nature between
Chinese and western traditions. The literal meaning of nature (physical landscapes, features,
animals and resources) does not differ between cultures, but the relationship between people and
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nature does (Hung 2019). Western thought (at least since the social contract theorists) views
nature as the state from which people originated and diverged from, which is evident by the state
of nature argument and especially nowadays with post-Darwin thought (Singer 2005).
Traditional Chinese thought, as mentioned before, made a clear separation between man and
nature, but both entities are bound to heaven’s will. The Chinese philosophies differed in how
similar those relationships were; Confucius thought tianming affected humans and nature in
reminiscent, but not exact ways, whereas Laozi thought the relationship was the same for both
groups and nature followed heaven perfectly (so humans should follow nature’s example and
live naturally) (Hung 2019). The implication of this cultural difference is that western
philosophers assumed that humans started out stateless and transitioned into governments, but
Confucian philosophers assumed the opposite was true since tianming preordained state living
for humans.
Both the enlightenment thinkers and Daoists are similar in that they idolize the state of
nature8 and believed that virtues9 were inherent to people regardless of the state. This
comparison is best expressed in An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals (released 20
years prior to Common Sense); Hume (2008) distinguishes between natural virtues derived from
intrinsic morality and artificial virtues created to facilitate societal and state functions. Though
specific natural virtues are categorizable through reason, the sense of what is right and wrong is
undefinable and instinctual; Hume even says the best way to know if something is a virtue is to
judge your reaction to being attributed a specific trait (Hume 2008). Instinctive virtue is also a

8

A state of nature is never overtly used in Daoist text, however, they do refer to naturalistic conditions actions that
imply statelessness, which I consider to be analogous to the western concept.
9
There are considerable differences between virtues across the texts used in this paper. Since this paper is
comparing where virtues originated instead of what those virtues are, I am using the word virtues to refer to a group
of desirable and just traits that the individual philosophy values.
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defining aspect of the Daoist ethics; wuwei entails a spontaneity in one’s actions according to the
whims of the dao which, for morality, is based on the individual’s natural inclinations (Wong
2021). Daoist value self-cultivation over social indoctrination for this reason, evident in how
Laozi encouraged people to follow nature to learn tianming (Hung 2019), how Zhuangzi
constantly references nature in his analogies (Zhuangzi 2013) and even in the first line of the
Dao De Ching proclaiming that the true dao and the spoken dao were not the same (i.e the true
dao cannot be taught) (Laozi 2013). Hume was obviously not skeptical about the corrupting
influence of society on virtues, but both he and the Daoists agreed that virtues did not require a
state for to exist.
These parallels are not found in Hobbes nor Confucianism. Hobbes did not believe that
virtues existed in the state of nature, only self-interest did; he is the only philosopher discussed in
this paper that thought virtues were a social construct. Xunzi thought that ren existed and could
be cultivated, but it had to be taught because human nature was evil. One could argue that a
negative view on human nature creates more restrictive states (Hobbes was the most open to
ruler-imposed laws than the philosophers who followed him and Xunzi inspired legalism, a very
restrictive philosophy (Goldin 2018)), but this does not seem to apply to Confucius and Mencius,
both of whom held more positive views of human nature and yet also argued for interventionalist
states. However, if we consider the subtext underlining their theories, that the state is necessary
for the individual’s development, then it is clear that Confucius and Mencius were skeptical that
humans without the state would ever become moral, regardless of their human nature. It is
argued in both The Analects and Mencius that although some people can be born sages, most
people must learn to become them. Even Mencius, who claims that human nature is good, argues
for a stricter state (i.e the state was always a presence in the citizen’s lives) than Confucius, who
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was seemingly indecisive on the matter (Morgan 2001). Thus, the difference between Hobbes
and the Confucians and the enlightenment thinkers and Daoists is the former’s skepticism
towards the ability of humans to act morally in the state of nature led to higher control states
compared to the latter.
Conclusion
Three general principles of philosophical development can be derived from the analysis
done in this paper. . .
1) A shift from external to internal justifications for the state results in secular state
justifications. The success and authority of the state depended on the ruler’s/citizen’s ability to
deduce, learn and abide to tianming and natural laws after the Shang dynasty and in postreformation Europe. Philosophies that arose during and after this shift became centralized around
secular principles (ren, human dao, natural rights) and divine right arguments were refuted
and/or abandoned entirely, regardless of the different conceptualizations of heaven across
cultures.
2) Optimal states are based on virtuous leaders when the state is integrated into the
citizen’s lives and virtuous structure when the state is not. Confucianism prioritizes sage rulers as
essential to the state because virtuous living is deemed crucial for the state’s ability to operate
successfully and filial piety places rulers in teaching roles for their subjects. This relationship is
corruptive in Daoism, so Daoist rulers must instead prioritize wuwei in state interventions where
selective action is utilized. Success comes from the state following the dao rather than its ruler.
Western traditions adhering to natural law arguments likewise idolize states which adhere most
closely to the natural laws rather than the qualities of its ruler. Hobbes was the most supportive
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of monarchies (and the most pessimistic of the state of nature), yet even he valued kings for their
institutional role as consolidates of power rather than their qualities.
3) Philosophical skepticism towards human nature creates more restrictive governments.
Unless virtues are both attributed to and can be achievable by humans in a state of nature,
philosophies will attribute the creation of virtues to the state regardless of whether human nature
is good or bad. Hume and Daoists posited that virtues existed outside of the state, and as such,
Daoist and Paine’s ideal states could be expected to function with limited restrictions.
Confucians and Hobbes doubted or even refuted that people could achieve morality without the
state defining virtues, so the state was necessary for cooperation, leading to philosophies that
were more controlling by comparison.
These principles, being derived from comparative developments, should be applicable to
Confucian/Daoist and social contract/enlightenment era thoughts, though more research into
their universality ought to be performed before applying them to unrelated philosophies. What I
wish to emphasize here is that the process of comparing philosophies by their developments, as
shown in this paper, has promise in explaining changes within philosophies regardless of cultural
context. This has the potential to frame differences in east/west philosophies without relying on
culturally specific principles and in understanding why thoughts change over time.
Limitations/Further Research
The greatest challenge to the comparisons offered by this paper is the different
progressions for Chinese and pre-libertarian thoughts. Confucianism and Daoism originated as
competing ideologies during the same period; this is evident by the amount of commentary found
in Mencius, Xunzi and Zhuangzi’s referring each other’s philosophies. American libertarianism’s
progression was very linear in comparison; Hobbes, Locke and Paine’s work built off each other,
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which is why a clear transition emerges between them. Although developmental comparisons
were made between these philosophies, the differences between Confucian and Daoist thinkers
within their own philosophies were not as substantial as between the social contract and
enlightenment theorists. Expanding research into Han dynasty Confucian and Daoist
philosophers may yield comparisons in this regard (though Daoism became less politically
relevant as time progressed).
The conclusions made in this paper would also be strengthened by applying
developmental comparisons to different philosophical movements within western and Chinese
cultures. Other philosophies from the Hundred Schools of Thought had varying views of filial
piety, human nature and heaven’s will (Chan 1963), which would make them perfect for testing
the three principles outlined in this paper. Researching Yangism in particular could lead to
compelling comparisons, as it prescribes a self-preservation focus to people as a part of the Dao
similar to how the social contract theorist thought about natural rights (which is absent in both
Confucianism and Daoism) (Hansen 2021). Expanding into other movements with similar ideas
could also be beneficial. Daoist political thought is often portrayed as anarchist due to its focus
on a non-acting state (Feldt 2010), so comparisons with western anarchist thought would be
interesting. Kropotkin (1897), for example, wrote about how human nature is corrupted by social
structures and how virtues were inherent in people, both of which are themes in Daoism. This
would also allow the paradigm shift caused by Darwinism to be compared to the state of nature
based social contract theorists.
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